With tensions between Russia and the West at some of the highest levels seen since the end of the Cold War, there has been renewed concern about the possibility of nuclear conflict. Russia possesses the largest nuclear arsenal of any country, with around 6,000 total warheads. This has prompted questions about whether Russia would ever use these weapons against the United States or its NATO allies, and whether the US homeland could potentially be impacted.
Russia’s Nuclear Capabilities
Russia inherited a substantial nuclear stockpile following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Current estimates peg Russia’s inventory at around 6,000 total warheads, with about 1,600 actively deployed on ballistic missiles and at bomber bases. Here is a breakdown of Russia’s current nuclear forces:
| System | Deployed Warheads |
|---|---|
| ICBMs (land-based) | 800 |
| SLBMs (submarine-based) | 576 |
| Strategic Bombers | 200 |
Russia’s land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), each armed with a single nuclear warhead. The bulk of Russia’s ICBM force consists of SS-18 and SS-19 missiles. Russia also operates a fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) that can launch submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) while submerged. Currently Russia has 11 SSBNs, with D-type Delta IVs forming the backbone of the fleet. Finally, Russian Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers can carry long-range nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.
In addition to deployed strategic warheads, Russia retains several thousand “nonstrategic” nuclear weapons for potential use on shorter-range delivery systems. There is less transparency and accounting of these types of tactical weapons. Russia is also actively modernizing its nuclear forces, developing new ICBMs (e.g. Sarmat), SLBMs (e.g. Bulava), cruise missiles, and more sophisticated SSBNs.
Possibility of a Russian Nuclear Strike on the US
Given Russia’s still-formidable nuclear arsenal, what is the possibility of Moscow actually launching an attack on the US homeland? Most experts consider the chances very remote, for a few key reasons:
- The US has comparable nuclear capabilities and could retaliate in kind. Russia wants to avoid a catastrophic exchange.
- Attacking the US would almost certainly invoke NATO’s collective defense provisions.
- The US has advanced missile defenses that could potentially intercept some incoming warheads.
- The economic and diplomatic consequences for Russia would be devastating.
A surprise first strike to try and disarm the US would be incredibly difficult – analysts estimate Russia could at best take out around 70-80% of US land-based ICBMs. The US would retain a secure second-strike capability with its SLBMs at sea. Ultimately, the nuclear balance and threat of retaliation makes a direct attack on the US homeland very unlikely for anything short of an existential threat against Russia itself.
However, the possibility cannot be 100% ruled out. Tensions have flared at times with aggressive Russian actions – for example, cyberattacks, election interference, and the conflict with Ukraine. A conventional military confrontation with NATO that escalated out of control is one potential risk scenario identified by experts. Miscalculation during a crisis could also lead to brinksmanship and nuclear threats intended to deter, but unintentionally escalating into nuclear use.
Russian Missiles That Can Reach the Continental US
Russia currently possesses intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching any part of the continental United States from launch sites based in Russia. Here are some of the main missiles that could strike US targets:
| Missile | Range (km) | Warheads |
|---|---|---|
| RS-28 Sarmat (SS-X-30 Satan 2) | 18,000+ | 10-15 MIRVs |
| RS-24 Yars | 12,000+ | 4-6 MIRVs |
| RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle) | 10,500+ | 1 |
The Sarmat is Russia’s newest heavy ICBM still in development as a replacement for aging SS-18s, with an estimated range likely exceeding 18,000 km when operational. The Yars is a road-mobile missile carried on transporter erector launchers, while Topol is also mobile and designed specifically to enhance survivability and penetrability against missile defenses.
Even many of Russia’s intermediate-range systems not classified as ICBMs, such as the SS-26 Stone and SS-N-32 Bulava SLBM, could potentially reach parts of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska from Russian territory. Bombers like the Tu-160 Blackjack have aerial refueling capability and could conceivably strike continental US targets from launch points over the Arctic and North Atlantic, though with far more limited effectiveness.
US Ballistic Missile Defenses
The United States has taken steps since the early 2000s to develop defenses against limited long-range ballistic missile threats, especially from “rogue states” like Iran and North Korea. However, analysts concur that the US has no defense that could reliably defeat the full arsenal of Russia’s advanced ICBMs and SLBMs. Here is a summary of major US ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems:
| System | Number | Main Capabilities |
|---|---|---|
| Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) | 44 interceptors | Land-based system to intercept incoming warheads in space |
| Aegis/SM-3 | ~34 ships w/ 90 interceptors | Sea-based system to intercept short and intermediate-range missiles |
| Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) | 9 batteries | Mobile system for terminal phase interception |
The GMD consists of ground-based interceptor missiles stationed in Alaska and California to destroy incoming warheads in space. The latest models have demonstrated hit-to-kill capability in testing, but real-world reliability and ability to handle saturation attacks remains uncertain.
The Aegis/SM-3 systems on US Navy ships provide some protection from medium and intermediate range missiles, but are not designed to counter ICBMs. Terminal defenses like THAAD only engage missiles in their final descent phase, with limited battle space and capacity against ICBM-type threats.
In summary, while the GMD provides a limited defense of the US homeland against smaller scale attacks, analysts agree current BMD technology is not mature or expansive enough to blunt the damage from a major Russian ICBM assault. Thus, deterrence through the threat of assured nuclear retaliation remains central to the US strategy. Ongoing research on concepts like high-energy lasers may offer more effective BMD capabilities in the future.
Potential US Targets
Russia has a range of options with its mix of ICBMs and SLBMs to deliver nuclear warheads to a variety of targets across the US homeland. Major potential targets include:
- Early warning radar arrays and military command centers
- ICBM bases in states like North Dakota, Montana, Wyoming
- Strategic bomber bases
- Major ports and naval bases
- Key infrastructure like power grids and transportation hubs
- Highly populated metro areas
Early in the trajectory of any nuclear conflict, Russia would likely prioritize US nuclear forces and command and control nodes with the goal of degrading capability to retaliate. Critical military facilities throughout the US interior could come under precision attack from MIRVed Russian ICBMs.
However, with weapons to spare, Russia could potentially target major US cities including New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, etc. Highly accurate ICBMs like the Yars could destroy key economic and transportation centers across the country. The goal would be to inflict massive damage on US infrastructure, government, economy and society – essentially seeking to remove the US as a global rival. Millions of civilian lives would be endangered.
Damage Potential from Detonations
The potential damage from even a single modern thermonuclear weapon detonated over the United States would be catastrophic for areas near the blast site:
- Within a roughly half mile radius, most buildings and infrastructure would be completely destroyed, with a high fatality rate.
- Within 1-3 miles, weaker buildings like houses would be leveled, while stronger structures would incur major damage and fires.
- Beyond 5 miles, windows could shatter from the blast wave, buildings damaged, injuries likely.
- Within 15-20 miles, risk of injuries from flying debris and fires
The thermal radiation radius for third degree burns extends to about 6 miles from a 1 megaton surface burst, while the air blast radius for human fatalities due to being thrown against objects extends out to almost 4 miles.
For an attack against a densely populated metro area like Manhattan, analysts project a ground burst from a 550 kiloton Russian warhead could kill over 700,000 people and injure 1.5 million more from just the initial effects. But the damage radius, casualties, and scale of destruction varies based on factors like detonation height, weapon yield, population density, weather conditions, etc.
Across a wider area, the fallout and radiation effects could also be severe, potentially requiring long-term evacuation and quarantines depending on prevailing wind patterns and where radioactive plumes travel. Water and agricultural contamination could impact food supplies. Overall, even one nuclear strike could cripple an entire city and surrounding region for an extended period.
Could the US Missile Defenses Stop an Attack?
In a hypothetical Russian nuclear strike scenario, the United States would rely on its ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system to try and intercept incoming ICBM warheads before they reached US soil. However, there are a few major limitations:
- Only 44 total GMD interceptors are currently deployed, divided between bases in Alaska and California.
- Each interceptor would likely need to launch 2-3 times to have a high chance of hitting the warhead due to technical constraints.
- The system has no capability against SLBM or air-launched cruise missiles.
Against a mass raid with hundreds of reentry vehicles from Russia’s ICBM fields alone, the GMD system would quickly become overwhelmed. Even if interceptors performed flawlessly, there are far too few to meaningfully blunt the attack. Any SLBMs fired from Russian submarines at sea would have free runs to their coastal targets.
Some simulated wargame analyses envision the system performing better than expected in “limited” nuclear exchanges, potentially intercepting 30-40% of incoming warheads. But in an all-out nuclear scenario, the GMD would at best only slightly reduce the damage against a handful of targets. The vast majority of Russian warheads would reach their destinations unimpeded.
Ultimately, while missile defense contributes some protection, experts agree it is not nearly extensive enough yet to replace deterrence against another nuclear power through the countervailing threat of retaliatory strikes. This dynamic with Russia is unlikely to change in the next decade based on current technological limitations and the sheer scale of Russia’s arsenal.
Could the US Military Intercept Russian Missiles?
Experts concur that the US military has very limited capability to intercept Russian ICBMs in their boost or ascent phase before warheads detach and follow independent trajectories. Two potential options include:
- F-15s equipped with the ASM-135 missile that could attempt boost-phase interception, but this program was abandoned in the late 2000s.
- High-powered lasers mounted on drones that could theoretically engage missiles near launch sites, but technology remains immature with geographic constraints.
Russia’s use of road-mobile ICBMs with multiple launch sites spaced across its vast territory makes reliable boost-phase interception extraordinarily difficult. Submarine-launched missiles are essentially invulnerable to this tactic.
Midcourse interception depends heavily on early warning to dispatch interceptors in a timely fashion, along with sufficient numbers of interceptors near predicted impact points across the homeland. But as examined above, current US GMD capabilities are limited against Russian-scale attacks.
Terminal phase interception has the least reaction time for layered defense, but is mostly relevant to protect limited high-value areas from smaller attacks rather than national-level defense against Russian ICBMs.
In summary, experts assess the chances of militarily intercepting a determined, large-scale Russian ICBM/SLBM attack using boost, midcourse, or terminal defenses as extremely low based on huge geographic constraints and numbers of incoming warheads.
US Retaliatory Capabilities
In the event of a Russian nuclear attack, the United States has powerful forces to retaliate in kind as a deterrent against initiation of nuclear conflict:
- Over 400 Minuteman III ICBMs dispersed across 3 bases in the continental US
- 14 Ohio-class SSBN submarines each armed with up to 20 Trident SLBMs on constant patrol
- Over 60 nuclear-capable B-52 and B-2 strategic bombers dispersed at key bases
These three legs of the nuclear triad provide assured second strike capability even if some elements were disabled. For example, SSBN Patrol patterns intentionally position missiles within range globally at any given time. Bombers can also be placed on advanced alert and dispersed to many runways.
The majority of the US arsenal is fielded on highly survivable SLBMs and ICBMs with MIRV capabilities similar to Russian missiles. Current nuclear modernization plans including the B-21 Raider bomber, Columbia-class SSBN replacement, and GBSD ICBM replacement will sustain capability. Multiple warheads on each missile complicates any defense.
Though exact plans are secret, the US maintains a flexible range of nuclear options tailored to the threat scenario, including limited strikes focused on military targets. But in an “all options on the table” existential nuclear exchange, the US could potentially inflict damage on Russian cities and infrastructure on a scale proportionate to that sustained by the US homeland. This maintenance of mutual risk underpins deterrence.
Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation
Even with extensive arsenals controlled by the US and Russia, the world has managed to largely avoid uncontrolled horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. However, the spread of technology, withdrawal from arms control agreements, and potential future US-Russia tensions could begin to unravel this as more states seek nuclear capabilities:
| Reason | Effect |
|---|---|
| Technical barriers eroding over time | More states capable of developing indigenous weapons |
| Weakened international non-proliferation norms | Reduced stigma against pursuit by additional countries |
| US-Russia arms racing | Incentive for allies like China/India to build up forces |
Pakistan, India, North Korea all developed nuclear weapons post-Cold War, defying efforts at containment. Iran’s program remains a question mark. However, vertical proliferation by Russia and the US has mostly stalled with major reductions under New START. Mutual fear of uncontrolled horizontal proliferation may incentivize restraint by Washington and Moscow going forward. But absent active diplomacy combined with military deterrence, the risks remain.
Effect of a Major Exchange on the Climate
Most experts believe even a large-scale nuclear exchange between Russia and the US would not appreciably alter the global climate or usher in a “nuclear winter.” This differs from modeling in the 1980s that predicted severe cooling. Newer research suggests more limited impacts:
- Scenario of 100 15-kiloton detonations could lower global temperatures by 1-2 degrees C for 1-2 years by blocking sunlight.
- A war with thousands of 100-kiloton detonations could potentially lower temperatures by 4-5 degrees C in some models.
- But far less likely all cities burned or targets optimized for firestorms.
- Southern hemisphere likely less affected overall.
The exact climate impacts depend heavily on uncertain variables like smoke plumes reaching the stratosphere. While agricultural yields could reduce from temperature shifts in afflicted regions, runaway cascading ecosystem collapse is improbable based on current knowledge. Ozone loss could increase UV exposure in some areas. But massive dark winters and global crop failures are unlikely outcomes based on modern simulations accounting for lower planned arsenal yields and damage expectations compared to Cold War-era models.
Humanitarian and Economic Consequences
The humanitarian toll from even a “limited” nuclear exchange would be massive. For example:
- An exchange of 100 x 15 kiloton weapons could cause over 2 million direct deaths and injuries based on models.
- Millions more at risk from burns, radiation sickness, opportunistic disease, starvation, etc.
- Displaced refugee populations could reach tens of millions.
- Severe infrastructure damage would disrupt medical services.
- Supply chain breakdowns worsen food, water, power shortages.
In economic terms, a nuclear exchange with Russia has been estimated to immediately wipe out 20-40% of US GDP. The long-term impacts of infrastructure damage, disrupted trade patterns and economic risk could substantially depress global economic growth for a prolonged period. Stock markets would almost certainly crash and potentially be shut down. Currencies could experience destabilizing volatility. The interconnected nature of the modern global economy implies effects would spill over worldwide.
While the very worst scenarios envisioned during the Cold War now appear exaggerated, the damage and humanitarian consequences would still be catastrophic almost beyond comprehension. Even “limited” nuclear use could have massive effects on the local and global population.
Conclusion
Russia retains a formidable nuclear arsenal with the capability to inflict severe damage on US military and economic infrastructure as well as civilian populations if deterrence failed and conflict broke out. While missile defenses provide some protection against smaller-scale attacks, they do not eliminate the threat. However, the likelihood of deliberate Russian nuclear use remains low given US retaliatory capability. While predictions are complicated, most experts believe the climate effects would be real but not apocalyptic. Regardless, any substantial nuclear exchange would have severe humanitarian, economic and geopolitical ramifications across the globe. Hopefully open communication and sustained deterrence continue to prevent such a crisis from developing between the nuclear superpowers.